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T H E  N A T I O N A L  P R O D U C T  
OF EAST G E R M A N Y  
In a recent article1 data and calculations on industrial production 
and the labor force in Soviet Germany were given. The present 
article offers similar calculations for the other major sectors of the 
economy and attempts to make estimates for the major uses of the 
Gross National Product. 
Because we are dealing with a Soviet economy it becomes neces- 
sary to describe the sources on which calculations are based and to 
explain the methods used in some detail. This has been done in the 
Appendix (p. I 56 ff.) . 
OVE R - A L L  D E V E L O P M E N T S  
Table I gives the result of the calculation of the Gross National 
Product (GNP) by industrial origin in 1936 and 1950 in West German 
prices. For comparison’s sake the estimates for the GNP of the Federal 
Republic are also included2. The table includes two alternative 
estimates for trade. The estimate arrived at by the “employment 
method” seems preferable to the estimates based on deflation, as 
explained in the Appendix (pp. I 6016 I ) . Finally, two summations have 
been made, one which corresponds to the East German concept of 
the GNP, the other which corresponds to the Western coverage and 
which includes the services of those people which in Eastern ter- 
minology are employed in “areas outside of material production”. 
An attempt has also been made to adjust the GNP of the Federal 
Republic to correspond to the East German coverage3. 
I .  WOLFGANG F. STOLPER, “Labor Force and Industrial Development in 
Soviet Germany”, Quarter& Journal of Economics, Vol. 7 I ,  November I 957, 
2. Only the estimates in 1936 prices, available for the years 1950-1955 are 
shown. 
3. The precise adjustments are described in footnote 4 to Table I, c. The 
calculations made differ from the normal statistics in that neither actually paid 
nor imputed rents are included. 
PP. 5 18-545. 
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First a brief comment on the relative size of the GNP 1936 in the 
Federal Republic without West Berlin and in the German Demo- 
cratic Republic (GDR) including East Berlin. In  that year the West 
German GNP was about 2 l I 2  times the East German, with the West 
German population being roughly twice the East German popula- 
tion. By 1955 the West German population was about three times 
that in Soviet Germany but the gap in the aggregate GNP had wid- 
ened. The West German GNP was more than four times the East 
German GNP. 
Secondly, if 1955 or 1957 is compared with 1936, the increase in 
the aggregate GNP was substantially greater in the West than in the 
East, the Eastern showing being even worse when measured in 1950 
than when measured in 1936 prices. There can be no doubt that 
the per capita product in the GDR was by 1956 barely above 1936 
while it was in the Federal Republic substantially above it4. 
Thirdly, in both the Federal Republic and in the GDR, the in- 
creases in the GNP between 1955 and 1936 are larger if the East 
German coverage of the GNP is taken, than when the West German 
coverage is taken, but the differences are not significant. 
Fourth, since 1950, the year of the First Five Year Plan, the rates 
of change are not too different. The GNP of the Federal Republic 
has increased in 1955 by about 63 lieyo above 1950. The East German 
4. The per capita figures are found on Table 6 (p. 152). During the summer 
of 1958 I had occasion to discuss my estimates with various gentlemen of the 
Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung. The over-all results of the estimates 
made in West Berlin for the post-war years were substantially similar to the 
estimates presented here. Dr. Abeken and Dr. Kupky pointed out, however, 
that there was evidence that industrial production in 1936 was substantially under- 
estimated by the census. Thus the growth compared to 1936 of aggregate or per 
capita GNP would be smaller than the calculations presented indicate. At the 
time that this is written it is not known to me what the order of magnitude of the 
required adjustment might be. The reader is, however, advised that West German 
sources have adjusted the prewar figures for major crops upward by 10% (see 
Appendix p. 158). This adjustment has already been made in the estimate of 
agriculture and a similar increase of the estimate for industry would raise the 
estimated GNP of the GDR (Western coverage) in 1936 from 18.0 billion RM to 
about 20 billion RM, measured in 1936 prices, which would reduce the aggregate 
growth between 1956 and 1936 to about 10% as against 15% shown by the 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































136 W O L F G A N G  F. S T O L P E R  
increase was 40 to 45%. This means that the increase in the per 
capita GNP was about the same in the two Germanies. 
These facts hold considerable interest. In the one case in which 
a Communist and a free economy are historically, culturally, and 
economically comparable there is no evidence whatsoever that the 
Communist economy has grown faster, even on a per capita basis. 
Furthermore, the per capita product in 1950 was in the East only 
about two thirds of the West. Hence the same rate in increase of 
per capita product has meant that the Communist regime has not 
only not been able to catch up but that the gap in per capita product 
has actually widened from 1950 to 1955. The aggregate GNP in 1950 
was in the East less than 80% of 1936 but in the Federal Republic 
about 10% above it. 
Now, there are some perfectly obvious reasons to explain the 
differences in the development in East and West Germany. There 
has been a heavy loss of population from the East to the West which 
has consisted increasingly of people of working age and frequently 
of highly trained men and women. There has been a very substantial 
exploitation by the occupying power in the East which did not 
cease until 1954 and which was not reversed until 1958 if indeed it 
was reversed. Data on the population movements were presented in 
the already mentioned article in the Quarter@ Journal of Economics, 
and the estimates on investments given below will give an idea of 
the extent of exploitation by the occupying power. 
Finally there is a startling inefficiency in the intra-bloc economic 
relations in which an exploitation by Soviet Russia has gone for 
many years hand in hand with a strong autarkic tendency in in- 
dividual areas and indeed with the notion that even individual small 
areas should, if at all possible, have a full complement of all in- 
dustries. Only very recently has the notion of international spe- 
cialization been permitted to enter the operational planning phase 
and, as far as we know, the international integration of the bloc is 
still very crude. By contrast, the Federal Republic was never ex- 
ploited and received large-scale aid from its former enemies; it not 
only organized its economy domestically more efficiently, but de- 
liberately planned on an intimate international integration of her 
economy with the world. 
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T H E  SECTORAL O R I G I N  
O F  T H E  GROSS NATIONAL P R O D U C T  
All of these explanations for the differentials in the GNP in East and 
West Germany are correct and they are probably basic. Yet, there 
is more to the differences in development of the two Germanies. 
Some of the factors associated with specific planning difficulties, will 
become apparent when the aggregate figures are broken down into 
their major components either by origin or by use. 
I therefore turn to the more interesting figures of the results of 
the sectoral origin of the East German Gross National Product. 
( I )  Agriculture. There is no question possible that by 1955 or 1957 
the GNP attributable to agriculture was substantially below prewar, 
though the extent of the decline is open to question5. The outstanding 
finding is that there is no discernable development since 1950, but 
there are only ups and downs. If anything, there has been a stabiliza- 
tion of agricultural output since 1953. The bad result of 1956 must 
in part be blamed on catastrophic crops rather than the workings 
of the economy proper. 
Within the agricultural sector there have been changes back and 
forth in the relative importance of crops and of animals and animal 
product. By 1950 about half of the total value was due to crops, but 
by 1957 the value of animals and animal product was again about 
70% of the total value of agricultural output as it had been before 
the war. Within the crop sector the total acreage has not changed 
very much but grains take now a much smaller acreage which in 
turn is reflected in the very substantial increases in the imports, 
particularly of bread grains. Large increases in acreage have taken 
place in oil seeds and fiber plants, but also in the acreages attri- 
butable to vegetable and fodder plants. The major crops of potatoes 
and sugar beets commanded roughly the same acreages before and 
after the war6. 
5 .  See Appendix p.157, the discussion of the new East German figures on 
net yields of major crops. 
6. I have made calculations on the sales value of agricultural marketable out- 
put in the Federal Republic along the identical lines of the East German calcula- 
138 W O L F G A N G  F. STOLPER 
The question arises naturally why agricultural output should in 
East Germany as elsewhere in the Communist world have proved 
to be the Achilles heel of the planned economy. The answer certainly 
cannot be found in either reduction of acreage or in the reduction 
of labor inputs. In fact, until 1955, employment in agriculture, 
forestry, and the water economy was probably greater than in 1939'. 
As is shown in Table 2, the labor force in agriculture has fallen 
Table 2 
Employment in Agriculture 
































substantially from 1950 to 1953. I t  has then increased to 1955 and 
has since fallen again. In  1956 it was still slightly larger than in 1953. 
This implies that between 1950 and I 952 productivity in agriculture 
must have risen very much, but that since that date there has been 
no visible improvement. The year 1956 should probably be dis- 
regarded as a year of plain bad luck rather than unusual inefficiency. 
Undoubtedly land reform and inefficient planning contributed to 
this failure. Insufficient tractorization of the machine tractor stations, 
much too detailed planning as to how many animals should be kept, 
tions. These calculations indicate that the value of agricultural marketable 
output was by 1955 at least 30% above prewar in the Federal Republic while 
it was I o to 20% below in the German Democratic Republic. I have not calculated 
the inputs for the Federal Republic. There is no doubt, however, that in physical 
terms they have increased substantially more than in the East. 
7. See my "Labor Force and Industrial Development", op. cit., p. 525. 
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what had to be planted when and where, etc., inadequate prices 
which held no incentive to farmers, insufficient and uncoordinated 
fertilizer supply, contributed to the poor showing. 
All of these assertions can be documented from official statements 
and/or actions. In  I 956, for example, the prices for forced deliveries 
were raised substantially in the course of introducing “the principle 
of material interestedness of the working population” or, to put it 
into Western language, as well as better English, in order to provide 
better incentives for more efficient production. The detailed animal 
plans (Viehhalteplane) were abolished. Mechanization made prog- 
ress after 1953, particularly as far as machinery other than tractors 
is concerned. Still, even in 1956 the machine tractor stations had 
only 33,866 tractors, only 3,244 combines and all of 3,069 trucks, 
and 15,940 truck trailers of all kinds. In agriculture, machinery out- 
side of the Machine Tractor Stations, exists, but it is not numerous 
as far as it is known and it is certainly antiquated. The best estimate 
that could be made indicates that tractorization rose in the GDR from 
3.4 Hp/hectare in the prewar period to 12.7 in 1955. In  the Federal 
Republic on the other hand, the horsepower per hectare rose from 
the same 3.4 Hp/hectare before the war to 23.1 HP/hectare in 1950 
and to 52.1 m/hectare in 1955. The differences become even more 
pronounced when it is considered that the proportion of crop land 
to total acreage is higher in the GDR than in the Federal Republic. 
As an interesting side light it appears that the average horsepower 
per tractor has increased substantially in the East while it seems to 
have fallen in the West. 
The insufficient mechanization is accompanied by a lack of com- 
mercial fertilizer. Except for the important phosphates, more of all 
fertilizers is now used than before the war, but these increases fall 
substantially short of the increases in the Federal Republic and they 
are insufficient to fulfill the agricultural plans. Thus the Federal 
Republic used in the crop year 1g54/55 45.8 kilogram per hectare 
of nitrogen fertilizer, compared to only 36.8 kilogram per hectare 
in the GDR. I t  used 52.3 kilogram per hectare phosphates (p205) 
compared to only 20.9 kilogram per hectare in the GDR. Only with 
potash fertilizer did the GDR better than the Federal Republic : 
58.5 kilogram per hectare compared to 50.8 kilogram per hectare. 
But yields are not only limited by the availability of the limiting 
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fertilizer, they are also dependent on timing of the application of 
the fertilizer, which frequently was faulty*. 
The irregular availability of fertilizer provides also evidence of 
the shortcomings of planning. The allotted supplies were not only 
not available a t  the right moment, they were also too small to do 
the job, primarily because of export needs and this in turn involved 
the whole over-all planning and the international integration of the 
GDR into the Soviet bloc. Something more will have to be said on 
this point below. The insufficiencies of planning are most obvious 
in the case of nitrogen and potash fertilizersg. Thus the official sources 
state that “the need of mineral fertilizer to fertilize the soil and raise 
yields was in the fertilizer year 1955/56 571,000 tons of p205 and 
837,000 tons of K,O . . . They would have to be delivered during the 
next 5 years over and above the plan in order to give our soil a normal 
composition of nutrients”lO. The actual amounts supplied during the 
fertilizer year 1955/56 were 457,000 tons of K ~ O ,  152,400 tons of 
P,O, and rgg,goo tons of N (compared to a need of 364,000 tons)ll. 
Actual production of nitrogen fertilizer in 1955 was 293,408 tons, 
and of potash salts over 1.5 million tons K ~ O ,  but export require- 
ments took in 1955 1.0 million tons of ~ ~ 0 . l ~  I t  would be tiresome 
to give details for the other fertilizers. 
Other reasons also play a role, such as the fact that in the early 
post-war years special seed farms were treated like ordinary farms13, 
8. Figures from Statistische Praxis, Staatliche Zentralverwaltung fur Statistik 
beim Ministerrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Berlin (East), Oc- 
tober 1956, p. I 50. The same issue also states that the fertilizers were not delivered 
on time and that this, together with the general insufficiency, means that crops 
are more subject to the influence of the weather than in the West where fertilizer 
supplies are sufficient. The insufficiency of fertilizer is also blamed for the ex- 
cessive amounts of weeds. American experts who were questioned on the plausi- 
bility of these statements agreed that the timing of the application of fertilizer 
was important but that an excess of weeds could probably not be blamed on the 
absence of the correct fertilizer at the right time. 
9. Phosphates must be imported, but other fertilizers are abundantly pro- 
duced at home. 
10. Ibid., p. 151. 
I I .  Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1956 ed., p. 366. 
12. Production figures from Ibid., pp. 2771278. Export figures from Ibid., 
pp. 51g/520. Imports of phosphates in 1955 were only 50,422 tons, Ibid., p. 523. 
13. The area of the GDR was famous for sugar beet seeds. 
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seed qualities deteriorated and had to be brought up to standard 
anew. 
In general it is true to say, therefore, that agriculture has per- 
formed poorly because of insufficient incentives, insufficient invest- 
ments, and export requirements of the economy which had to be 
fulfilled. Improvements in the future can be expected as incentives 
are improved and investments in agriculture increased, but the 
international integration of the East German economy into the 
Soviet bloc is still inefficient. 
( 2 )  Industry. Since the recalculation of the figures previously pub- 
lished in the Quarterl_y Journal have resulted in no essential changes of 
the results, I can be brief in the discussion of this most important 
industrial sector. 
Measured in I 936 prices, industrial output in the GDR was in I 957 
about 44% above 1936, and in 1950 prices only 29% above it. The 
output of the Federal Republic was more than twice the prewar 
level. Even on a per capita basis, the output of the Federal Republic 
was about 50% above prewar, while there was but little change in 
East Germany to 1955. 
The basic difference in the developments of the two Germanies 
is that the output of the Federal Republic had already in 1950 sur- 
passed the prewar level by about 10% while the industrial output 
of the GDR was at most two thirds or three quarters of the prewar 
output, depending on the prices used to measure it. Since 1950, how- 
ever, when the First Five Year Plan was started, the performance 
of the GDR improved greatly, and the rate of growth of the per capita 
indices in the two Germanies since 1950 was essentially the same- 
which means, of course, that the GDR has had a difficult time closing 
the gap between East and West. 
Without going into an industry by industry comparison, the de- 
velopments can be summarized as follows : East German mining out- 
put increased much more than West German output compared to 
prewar, and slightly more compared to 1950. This is, of course, an 
achievement, but it reflects in part the fact that the planners favor 
basic and heavy industries, in part it is the consequence of the fact 
that West Germany has many more sources for its energy than solid 
fuels, e.g. imported oil, water power. In the highly important electric 
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power generation East German output doubled over 1936, but 
West German output quadrupled. 
Even in the important categories of production goods and of in- 
vestment goods West Germany did better compared to 1936, though 
about the same as East Germany since 1950, at least in investment 
goods. This is rather surprising, since the categories are specially 
favored by planners. Surely the lack of electricity and of basic 
materials (the latter reflecting the inefficient international integra- 
tion of the GDR into the Soviet Bloc) must be blamed for this. On the 
other hand, it is hardly surprising to find that the output of manufac- 
tured consumers goods was in 1957 in East Germany only about 
three fourths of I 936, while in West Germany it was already in I 950 
about 13% above prewar, and in 1955 was almost twice that level. 
This reflects not only the usual Soviet pattern, in which the consumer 
takes the hindmost. But there is actually some sense in letting the 
textile and clothing industries shrink from their prewar level, when 
they virtually supplied all of Germany and exported abroad, both 
markets now lost. A similar pattern of development can be observed 
also for the food industries whose level in 1950 was only two thirds 
that of 1936 but which have since reached a level of about 20% 
above prewar. 
The figures in Table 3 summarize most quickly the structural 
changes that have occurred, using East German classification. The 
basic industries-mining, chemicals, metal making, cement, etc.- 
are obviously emphasized, and are likely to keep their predominance 
since ideology demand that “Abteilung I” must grow faster than 
Basic Industries. . . . . . . . 
Metal Working Industries . . . 
Food Industries. . . . . . . . 
Light Industries . . . . . . . 
Table 3 
Percentage Share of Major Industry Groups in Industrial Output, Selected Years 
(Calculation in I 950 Prices) 
27.2 40.2 36.3 
27.0 27.4 33.1 
34.4 22.2 19.9 
I 1.4 10.2 10.7 
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“Abteilung 11”; and the existing shortages of basic materials in the 
GDR are likely to support ideology14. Even so, their relative im- 
portance has diminished since I 950. Metalworking industries-es- 
sentially the engineering trades, including electrical machinery and 
fine mechanics and optics-have increased in importance. This is 
a world wide phenomenon, and the only astonishing fact is that in 
1950 the increase had not yet started. Light industries-woodwork- 
ing, textiles, leather and shoes, clothing, cellulose and paper, printing 
-are the chief sufferers as is to be expected. 
The future planned pattern is likely to shift the emphasis some- 
what from basic to metal working industries, but how much must 
remain uncertain. I t  is unlikely, however, that the relative impor- 
tance of the two consumer goods sectors will be allowed to increase15. 
(3) Construction. The development in the construction sector indi- 
cates that its output surpassed its 1936 level only by 1956. The GNP 
attributable to construction in the Federal Republic was, on the 
other hand, already in 1955 twice as high as in 1936. This is, of 
course, understandable in terms of the preferences of the planner 
and the general availability of building material and labor, and it 
is confirmed by the looks of East Berlin and of the other German 
cities which travellers have described. The development of construc- 
tion becomes completely understandable when housing construction 
is split off. 
In  terms of dwelling units constructed (regardless of size) the area 
of the GDR erected in 1936 about 45% of the number built in the 
area of the Federal Republic. By 1955 the total number of dwelling 
units newly constructed and rehabilitated was only 32,830 according 
to official East German sources16. This is only 6% of the number 
of new dwelling units alone constructed in the Federal Republic. 
Considering the bomb damage and the increase in the population 
<‘ 14. Abteilung I” is, of course, essentially investment, and not identical with 
basic industries. 
15. For further details, see my Quarterly Journal article, OF. cit., p. 537f., and 
my forthcoming book. The figures given here differ from the previously published 
estimates for reasons discussed in the Appendix. 
16. Statistisches Jahrbuch DDR, OF. cit., 1957 ed., p. 334. The number was in 
1956 virtually the same, but in 1957 61,125 dwelling units were constructed. 
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of roughly 10% compared to 1936, this is extremely little, particu- 
larly as new dwelling units are rather small. The calculations made 
indicate that by 1950 housing was less than a fourth of the level of 
1936 (when it probably was rather high) and by 1956 it was still 
only about 44% of prewar. 
The implications of the low level of housing are not only that the 
population lived miserably but also that other construction recovered 
rather quickly and reached substantial levels. By 1950 other construc- 
tion, i.e. investment in plant, government and cultural buildings, 
etc., was at least at half the 1936 level. By 1955 the prewar level was 
reached and by 1956 it was surpassed by 15 to 30% depending on 
the prices used for measurement. Thus the poor performance of the 
construction sector as a whole is quite consistent with a much better 
performance in industrial and commercial construction and the 
result fits the pattern made familiar by Soviet experience. 
Unlike in agriculture, employment in construction increased sub- 
stantially from 1950 to 1953 but has since then been stabilized at  a 
level of around 480,000 to 4g0,ooo a year. The early increases in 
construction reflect therefore mainly increased labor inputs while 
since 1953 there must have been a substantial improvement in pro- 
ductivity. 
(4) Transport, Communication, and Trade. The GNP attributable to 
transport and communications has increased almost parallel to that 
of the industrial sector. By 1950 it was about a t  its prewar level and 
by 1956 it surpassed its prewar level by about 55 to 60%. Here too 
the West German developments were in the aggregate more vigor- 
ous; the GNP attributable to transport in the Federal Republic was 
in 1950 already 113 above prewar and by 1955 about 90% above it. 
(All calculations in 1936 prices.) 
The structure of the change is, as usual, of greater interest than 
the aggregate. The area of the GDR had important inland water 
ways but virtually no overseas or coastal shipping. I t  always was 
overwhelmingly a railroad economy. The division of Germany hit 
the area probably with unusual severity and the wounds inflicted 
by partition were probably more difficult to heal in this than in the 
industrial sector. Berlin, which had been the rail hub of the Reich, 
remained the rail hub of a truncated area and indeed the East 
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German Reichsbahn (which has not changed its prewar name) is 
in charge of all rail traffic in both East and West Berlin. The extensive 
canal system has been cut by the Western sectors of Berlin and re- 
quired some rebuilding. The Oder river became a border river and 
its terminal port, Stettin, Polish. This reduced its usefulness to the 
economy and induced the East German authorities to build up new 
port facilities and ship building facilities in such places as Wismar, 
which had been insignificant before the war. The Elbe river also lost 
much of its significance. Its terminal port Hamburg always was the 
major gateway for imports into and exports from the central areas 
of Germany or Czechoslovakia (while Rotterdam played a major 
role as a gateway to Germany). The political division and particu- 
larly the very drastic reorientation of international trade toward the 
Soviet Union and the satellites reduced the other major natural 
waterway to minor significance. 
Truck transport increased even in the GDR, but it picked up only 
what is essentially short distance and local traffic and it still is not 
very important. This is almost a foregone conclusion in view of the 
antiquated stock and the extremely limited production of trucks 
which even according to the official East German sources amounted 
in 1956 to only 17,201 units, about 1800 less than in 1936, when 
trucks played still a relatively subordinate role in the transport pic- 
ture of Germany. All of this adds up to the fact that the rail system 
has to bear the brunt of the increase in transportation. All Western 
observers agree that the Soviet German rail system is highly efficient, 
considering its overage rolling stock and the general shortages it has 
to work with. 
In  1936 the rails can be estimated to have shipped 98.7 million 
tons of goods over 15.1 billion ton/kilometer, 48.9% of them heavy 
goods, shipped at lower rates. By 1956 they shipped 210.2 million 
tons, 60% of them heavy goods at special rates, reflecting, of course, 
the expansion of mining and heavy industries. They were responsible 
for 27.3 billion ton/kilometer in that year. 
By contrast, inland shipping decreased from 2.5 billion ton/kilo- 
meter in 1936 to 2.3 billion ton/kilometer in 1956, and ocean shipping 
increased from a negligible 382 million ton/kilometer in 1936 to a 
still negligible 412 million ton/kilometer by 1956. Thus rail ship- 
ments in 1936 accounted for three fourths of the ton/kilometers of 
a 
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freight shipped and 20 years later for almost 85%. The implication 
of this development is, of course, that if the expansion had taken 
place mainly in the cheaper water transport the GNP attributable to 
transport would have been smaller. This in turn implies that the 
enforced or deliberately planned increase in the rail system has 
required additional resources which might have been used in other 
sectors and that the increase in the GNP attributable to transport is 
not an unmitigated blessing. Certainly the bulk goods, such as coal, 
iron ore, potatoes, sugar beets or cement, which now form 60% of 
total shipments could be much more cheaply and efficiently trans- 
ported on barges. Nevertheless, the fact that the expansion of the 
sector is not an unmitigated blessing should not blind one to the fact 
that it did take place. 
Passenger traffic expanded as vigorously on the railroads from an 
estimated 9.2 billion passengerfkilometer in 1936 to about 16.5 bil- 
lion in 1956. The important city railroad of Berlin increased its 
passenger traffic, however, only from 5.8 billion passenger/kilo- 
meters to 6. I billion passenger/kilometersl'. 
Other street railways and busses increased as vigorously as rail 
transport from 4.7 billion passenger/kilometers to 7.7 billion. The 
increase in passenger traffic is somewhat more difficult to interpret 
than the increase in freight traffic. The relatively greater increase 
in traffic outside of East Berlin reflects undoubtedly the small decline 
in the population of East Berlin since 1952 and the increasing im- 
portance of other industrial centers. It may be that the increasing 
passenger traffic also reflects a vigorous social development of paid 
vacations on a large and organized scale. I t  would be extremely 
surprising if it did not also form a part of the price which the economy 
has to pay for the housing shortage, forcing workers to commute over 
relatively long distances. All of these statements, however, are only 
suggestions, and not proven assertions. 
17.  The Berlin transport system consists of busses, trolleys, the subway, and 
the so called S-Bahn. The trolleys and busses did not cross sectoral lines until 
recently. Busses virtually did not exist in the Eastern sector and they are still 
unimportant. The underground railway goes through both sectors of the city and 
is run by the West Berlin authorities. The S-Bahn runs through both sectors of 
Berlin and into the Zone proper. It is part of the Reichsbahn and is administered 
by the authorities in East Berlin. 
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I t  is likely that the GNP attributable to communication and the 
postal services has also increased : employment increased from an 
estimated 90,800 in 1936 to 125,527 in 1956. I t  is possible (though 
unlikely to be quantitatively important) that the increase is due in 
part to a statistical reclassification or to a reorganization of the 
industry; for example, there may now be less messengers in plants 
and more use of the postal services and less private and more public 
communication between plants. Even if the productivity has fallen 
in this sector it is still likely that there has been a substantial increase 
in its output. As indicated in the Appendix, not much more can be 
said about this sector. 
Employment in trade was in 1956 just about at the estimated 1936 
level. I t  seems very unlikely that the GNP of trade is therefore any 
bigger in 1956 than it was 20 years earlier. There is no particular 
reason to suppose that the productivity of this sector was any different 
from 1936 in 1956 and it was almost certainly less before 1956 when 
the number of retail outlets was much smaller and the reorganized 
and socialized wholesale trade had to learn its business. Numerous 
examples of inefficiency in the trade sector could be given from the 
East German press and it was certainly a favorable sport of the East 
German papers to blame any shortages of consumer goods on the 
inefficiencies of trade rather than on inefficiencies in planning. In  
fact, shortages invariably were not attributed to lack of production 
but always to a breakdown in distribution. I t  is, however, impossible 
to say just what all these complaints add up to. 
Considering the fact that the value added of wholesale trade is 
relatively minor and that the output of manufactured consumer 
goods or the output of food, drink and tobacco was even in 1956 
either still below prewar or only little above it, it seems extremely 
unlikely that the GNP attributable to trade could have been in 1956 
above the prewar level. 
Employment in “unproductive” sectors is probably higher than 
it was before the war and in the absence of any knowledge what- 
soever, I have assumed that the value added per employee is un- 
changed. I t  is unfortunate that not more can be said about this 
sector18. 
18. The treatment of the nonproductive sector in East German methodology 
presents the curious case of the dead hand of Adam Smith keeping a much more 
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(5) Summary. The picture which emerges from this discussion in- 
dicates therefore that compared to 1936 the output of industry and 
transport sectors have increased, that of agriculture has decreased 
and that of the other sectors has more or less remained unchanged 
by the time the economy embarked upon the second five year plan. 
The most vigorously expanding sectors were mining and heavy in- 
dustries, investment goods and rail transports, while housing in 
particular and crop production for human consumption lagged. 
This contrasts sharply with the development in the Federal Re- 
public where all sectors of the economy expanded vigorously though 
even there the industrial sector grew more rapidly than the other 
sectors. I t  is, of course, a pattern which is not unfamiliar in other 
Communist countries. I t  throws some light on the claims of the 
planned economy of the Soviet type to promote the proportionate 
development of the economy. I will turn to the possible explanation 
of these developments below. 
T H E  U S E S  O F  T H E  GROSS NATIONAL P R O D U C T  
The estimating procedures described in the Appendix indicate that 
the figures on the uses of the GNP are not as reliable as the estimates 
for the GNP attributable to those sectors for which data in physical 
units are available. Nevertheless, the order of magnitude must be 
roughly correct and some of the findings, particularly those relating 
to the unexpectedly low investment ratios particularly in fixed in- 
powerful grip on Communism than on market economies while his live ideas are 
only grudgingly permitted to exercise an influence. While trade is defined as the 
“continuation of production in the sphere of circulation”, and passenger traffic 
and postal services have been included with productive employment in 1956 
without bothering to give ideological excuses at  all, research and teaching continue 
to be treated as nonproductive though useful. Perhaps the day will come when 
the obvious needs of a highly technological economy will induce East German 
economists to define research and teaching as “production in the preparatory 
phase”. 
Unfortunately, published East German data are quite insufficient to give a 
picture as to what happened to the numbers of doctors, health services, etc., 
though the number of teachers at  various levels could be somewhat laboriously 
arrived at. 
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vestment in the early years, go a long way to explain the lagging 
development in the East compared to the West. Aggregate con- 
sumption was in 1956 a little above prewar which implies, of course, 
that per capita consumption was still below it. Since rationing was 
not abolishedlg until 1958 and the consumption estimates refer only 
to individual private consumption of products which are sold against 
money or are consumed at the farms and do exclude consumption 
by society or of commodities for which payment is made indirectly 
through taxation, the estimate seems plausible. The best estimates 
I have been able to make is that consumption (as defined) took in 
1950 only about 1/3 of the GNP, compared to about 53% ever since 
1954. I t  is, of course, a startlingly low share but again hardly 
implausible : reparations were abolished in 1953 which accounts 
for a sudden jump in consumption. In 1950, on the other hand, 
rationing was severe and the production of manufactured consumer 
goods also had not recovered to more than about 40% of the 1936 
level. 
The really startling result is, however, the rate ofinvestment. Con- 
sumption in a Communist economy is after all just a stepchild, while 
it is a dogma that “Abteilung I” must grow faster than “Abtei- 
lung 11”. Nevertheless, the gross investment (including inventory 
accumulation) passed the prewar level in the GDR only in 195 I ,  and 
on a per capita basis temporarily in 1953 and finally in 1955. In  the 
Federal Republic it was aIready in 1950 well above the 1936 level 
in the aggregate and by 1951 also on the per capita basis. By 1955 
60% more was invested per man, woman and child in the Federal 
Republic than in Soviet Germany. 
The share of GNP going to gross investment has been about the 
same in East and West Germany throughout the post-war years. 
But not until 1953 did fixed investment take about as great a share 
of the GNP in Soviet Germany as in West Germany. On the other 
hand, inventory accumulation was startlingly bigger in East than 
in West Germany until 1954’’. In fact the chief effect of the June 
19. Even now fluid milk and apparently potatoes are not completely de- 
rationed. 
20.  R. W. CAMPBELL, “Soviet and American Inventory-Output Ratios”, 
American Economic Review, Vol. XLVIII, No. 4, September 1958, published after 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1953 uprising was to increase consumption at the expense of in- 
ventory accumulation, leaving fixed investment plans and “other” 
commitments essentially unchanged. 
Again, the particular figures can be questioned but it is certain 
beyond any reasonable doubt that East German investment in plant 
and equipment lagged behind West German performance as much 
as did consumption. The usual pattern of Communist economies of 
very high investment ratios does not hold in Soviet Germany. 
Furthermore, even when the investment ratios are of the same 
order of magnitude, the actual per capita investment remains sub- 
stantially lower in East than in West Germany. Only “other” uses 
and inventory accumulation (until 1953) are bigger in East than in 
West Germany. (See Table 6.) 
The reasons for the lagging may be peculiar to the GDR. They are 
clearly connected with the fact that the area was called upon to 
make very high reparations payments until I 953 estimated by some 
observers at about 25% of current industrial production. Aside from 
reparations payments there is once more the inadequate inter- 
national integration of the area. As with the export of fertilizers 
which had to be made at the expense of domestic agricultural needs, 
to pay for import of goods which might have been better produced 
at  home, so it is quite clear that a large proportion of investment 
goods, the production of which was favored in the GDR, had to be 
exported to pay for raw materials and foodstuffs as well as repara- 
tions. A confirmation of this statement can be found in the export 
figures of important investment goods (see Table 7). Other, equally 
startling figures could be given which suggest that perhaps half of 
the production of investment goods is exported. The figures could 
be multiplied sufficiently to present overwhelming evidence that a 
relatively forced production of investment goods is quite consistent 
with actually low investments. Figures on imports which are not 
given to save space, confirm the estimates. Raw materials and food 
stuffs naturally dominate the figuresz1. 
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2 I .  In addition to the exports of many individual machines and other invest- 
ment goods, whole installations were exported. Machinery installed in such a 
complete installation is not included among the figures quoted but it is included 
in the production figures. I have not found it possible thus far to evaluate the 
relative importance of exports of complete plants. 
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Table 7 
East German Production and Exports of Important Commodities, 1957’ 
Commodity 
Sulphur . . . . . . . .  
Synthetic Rubber . . . .  
Rubber Tires. . . . . .  
Gasoline . . . . . . . .  
Diesel Oil . . . . . . .  
Cement . . . . . . . .  
Ship motors, diesel and gas 
Stationary diesel and gas 
motors. . . . . . . .  
Lathes . . . . . . . . .  
of whichhtomatic . . 
Hydraulic Presses . . . .  
Rolling Mill Equipment . 
Steam Locomotives . . .  
Electric Locomotives. . .  
Trucks. . . . . . . . .  
Fishing “Seiner” . . . .  
Transformers. . . . . .  
Standard Typewriters . . 
Calculating and Similar 
Businessmachines . . .  
Bookkeeping Machines. . 
Freight Cars . . . . . .  









































































I .  Figures from SfolLlircher Jnhrbuch DDR, 1957 ed., p. 515ff.,  except for the statement of the 
production of gasoline and diesel nil which are West German estimates (see Deutsches Instirut 
fur Wirtschaftsfnrschung, Berlin [West], U‘ochenberichl, No. 24, 1957, p. 96). 
The “other uses” are, as indicated in the Appendix (p. 164), a 
miscellaneous lot. The startlingly high proportion in total GNP by 
1950-1954 is undoubtedly due to the extent of rcparations but by 
1956 the percentage was probably about 1/4 of the GNP, a quite 
normal ratio. It is entirely possible that there were real export sur- 
plusses on commercial account after reparations were abolished, 
when the export shipments shown by statistics suddenly increased. 
‘55 
Official data claim such surplusses for the years 1954 through 1956. 
Before that date the GDR had officially import surplusses, but repara- 
tions paid were not included in these figures22. 
The relatively low investment ratios and the high proportion of 
GNP required for “other” uses, explain sufficiently why developments 
in the GDR have lagged behind the Federal Republic. 
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C O N C L U D I N G  R E M A R K S  
As the figures indicate-and I am quite sure that their order of 
magnitude is correct-the GDR has by 1956 arrived roughly where 
the Federal Republic was in 1950. In  this period changes have oc- 
curred in planning methods, prices have been revised, rationing has 
been abolished, the major exploitation of the area by the occupation 
power has been abolished. As developments have proceded, the inter- 
national weaknesses of the system also have become apparent. Proba- 
bly for historic reasons, planning has proceded essentially on a 
national basis. The First Five Year Plan in the GDR and apparently 
also in the other satellites were formulated with none but the crudest 
regards of the plans of other countries. Officially the international 
coordination of Five Year Plans did not start until the Second Five 
Year Plan was ready to be discussed, which means not until 1956. 
Yet it is interesting to note that the Second Five Year Plan of the 
GDR for the years 1956 through 1960 did not become law until 
January, 1 9 5 8 ~ ~ .  The annual economic plan for 1958 was stated to 
have been the first to be passed before the beginning of the planning 
period. Present discussions in the press and the East German journals 
make it plain that the international coordination consisted almost 
exclusively of discussions about foreign trade which themselves took 
the national productions as planned by the national plans as data. 
The problems now discussed refer to a “true” coordination of the 
2 2 .  Statistitches Jahrbuch DDR, op. cit., 1956 ed., p. 518. The export surplus 
in 1954 was DM-Ost 409 million. In 1955 DM-Ost 234 million, and in 1956 
DM-Ost 163 million. Very little is known about the prices used to calculate the 
import and export values, but they seem to be world market prices of sorts. 
23. Published as special supplement to Neues Deutschland, Berlin (East), the 
official newspaper of the Party, on January 18, 1958. 
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national plans on the production level. Thus it has become known 
that the GDR is destined to become a major center of chemical 
production while it will reduce or abolish its output of many types 
of heavy machinery the location of which is to be shifted to Czecho- 
slovakia or the Soviet Union itself‘. I t  will be interesting to see how 
the planned economy is able to handle the problem of multi-lateral 
trade, and international specialization which in the free world does 
not cause the same kind of trouble. 
Center for International Studies, WOLFGANG F. STOLPER 
Massachusetts Institute of  Technology, Cambridge, 
and University o f  Michigan, Ann Arbor ( U S A )  
A P P E N D I X  
Available Data and Estimating Procedures 
AVAILABLE DATA A N D  T H E I R  RELIABILITY 
When the calculations were started a few years back, the first task consisted in 
collating a statistical abstract of Soviet Germany on the basis of newspaper 
clippings, articles in statistical journals, announcements of ministers, or promulga- 
tions of the five year plan and the annual economic plans. The data were all 
equally official but nevertheless frequently contradictory and suffered in all cases 
from a dearth of explanatory material. Since 1956 three statistical yearbooks 
have appeared, each of which presents an increasing amount of information 
which in turn is more carefully described in each successive volume. 
As in all other countries, data are either given in value terms or in physical 
units; there are, as of 1957 or 1958, 379 series on the output of industrial com- 
modities, a great number of them in physical units. There are furthermore data 
in physical units on the output of all major crops and animal products. All of 
these data can be directly used for the calculations of measures meaningful to a 
Western economist. 
On the other hand, numerous series and calculations presented in value terms 
are all but useless to the Western observer. The reasons are only partly that Soviet 
concepts differ from those customarily employed by Western economists. In my 
article in the Quarterb Journal‘ it was pointed out that in fact the differences in 
I .  “Labor Force and Industrial Development in Soviet Germany”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 71, November 1957, pp. 518-545. 
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the National Income concept, for example, have narrowed with the differences 
being increasingly resolved in favor of the Western concepts. Thus the concept 
of National Income includes since I 955 passenger traffic previously excluded. 
While the dubious concept of Gross Industrial Production continues to be used, 
new figures on net output are given by the Statistical Yearbook for the year 1957. 
The major reason why these figures can be used for analysis only with difficulty 
is that the prices used for the evaluation of these value figures are unknown and 
would probably be useless if they were known. The least informative sections of 
the Statistical Yearbook deal with the money supply, the budget, and prices. 
The reasons for this omission are not hard to guess but one reason which seems 
to be peculiar to East Germany is that the price system makes no sense in terms 
of the planned economy itself and is at present in process of revision, a process 
which started already in 1 9 5 3 ~ .  
On principle, and with only few exceptions, I have used only data given in 
natural units. The exceptions will be specifically explained in the proper place. 
I t  has been assumed that the data presented in physical units are not deliberately 
falsified. On the other hand it is incumbent on the investigator to find out in detail 
just what is being measured. Thus it is known that the statistics of industrial output 
included for a while also rejects; and crop statistics were until 1957 specifically 
stated to refer to biological yields. Since 1958, series on “net” yield are published, 
the “net” yield being defined as “actual yield after threshing but before loss 
during storage and other losses”. The series were published too late to be used 
in the calculations to be presented. 
There are several reasons besides lack of time why the calculations have not 
made use of the new net yield figures. In the first place they cover at most the 
years 1953-1957, and in a few cases even only the years 1956 and 1957. In the 
second place, the losses assumed for the important grains and even more for 
potatoes are improbably small, so that the “net” yield is a less reliable estimate 
ofwhat in the West is understood by barn yield than my own calculations. More- 
over, losses for potatoes after the harvest are rather big, and vary from 8-12%. 
It should be stated that for most crops the new “net” series are slightly above 
the estimated barn yield used in the calculations and in some cases, particularly 
for potatoes and sugar beets, they are substantially above them. In the case of 
pulses for human consumption on the other hand, or of important oil seeds, they 
are substantially below the estimates which have entered our calculations. On 
the whole, therefore, the results of the agriculture calculations may possibly be 
on the low side, though the difference between the calculations made and the 
results which would have been obtained had the new figures been used, cannot 
be very big. 
2. It would go too far in this context to enter into the details OC the questions just raised. The reader 
is referred to my preceding article and also to two articles by R. JANAKIEP, published in Statistischr Praxis, 
“Kritische Bemerkungen zur Anwendung der Kennziffer der Bruttoproduktion fur die Einschatzung der 
Produktionsarbeit des Industriebetriebes”, May 1957 and June 1957, an English translation of which is 
available in International Economic Papers, No. 8. See also “Price Policy and Price Formation in the German 
Democratic Republic”, (in German) Wirlschaflsluisrcnsc~~~l, Vol. 6, Special Issue No. 5. 1958, Verlag 
Die Wirtschaft, Berlin (East), 159 pp. 
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ESTIMATING P R O C E D U R E S  
Gross National Product by Origin 
( I )  The estimating procedures used to calculate the Gross National Product 
(GNP) attributable to industry need not be described in detail. The basic calcula- 
tions of the coal mining sector and the iron and steel sector were made by 
evaluating final output and deducting all known inputs. When this method was 
not possible, the estimating procedure consisted essentially in constructing an 
index industry by industry from the major outputs, weighted alternatively with 
1936 German and 1950 West German prices, and multiplying the 1936 base with 
this index. This method is essentially used also by the Statistisches Bundesamt. 
An exception to this procedure was the calculation of machinery output. I t  was 
assumed to move more or less parallel to the available input of iron and steel 
in a manner too complicated to describe briefly here. The electrical machinery 
output and the output of fine mechanics and optics was assumed to move in the 
same ratio to the output of engineering calculated by the just mentioned method, 
as the East German figures in “Messwerte” of electrical machinery and fine 
mechanics and optics had to the East German figures in “Messwerte” of output 
of engineering3. 
The figures presented in this article differ from the previously published results 
not because of any changes in estimating procedures but, first, because the 
official series of the Statistical Yearbook of the GDR have been substituted for 
previously unofficial or semi-official estimates, and, secondly, because a great 
number of new series which became available in 1957 have been included. The 
new series refer first to imports of important inputs, particularly the vital steel 
imports, and, secondly, to a substantially increased coverage of the consumer 
goods sector and the food, drink, and tobacco group of industries. 
( 2 )  The estimating procedures used to value agricultural output were as follows: 
The starting point were the biological yield series for all major and many minor 
crops. These figures were adjusted to arrive a t  barn yields. After consultation 
with West German experts it was decided that the barn yield of grains was about 
87% of the claimed biological yield of grains and of oil seeds, that the barn yield 
of pulses for human consumption and of sugar beets was 80% of the claimed bio- 
logical yield and that of potatoes 75%. In  addition, another 3 to 5% of the output 
was deducted to allow for spoilage in the barn, a percentage which is comparable 
to, though slightly higher than, West German experience. The output for 
1934-1938 which is the comparison period was raised by 10% for some major 
crops to allow for an underestimation in accordance with the practice of the 
Federal Republic for such comparisons4. 
3. For further detail, see my Quarterly Journal article (pp. 536/537) already referred to, and my forth- 
coming book. 
4. Handbuck fir Landwirtschoff und Emalrrung, issued by the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
(Bundesministerium fur Landwirtschaft und Ernahrung), Hamburg and Berlin, 1956, p. 53, Table 91,  
Footnote 3. 
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On principle, only output for human consumption and industrial use was 
valued. This involved an estimate of consumption on the farms. The basis for 
the estimates were official data on per capita consumption ofimportant food stuffs 
and the now published data on forced deliveries and government purchases which 
were presumably the equivalent of market production and which were adjusted 
for consumption on the farms by the assumption that farmers ate by and large 
as well as the non-farm population. The fodder crops and those part of grain 
crops which remained within agriculture were treated as intermediate products 
and not evaluated. All crops were valued in West German prices. 
The animal sector was broken down into three parts: the live weight of 
slaughtered animals, the live weight of the change in the stock of animals; and 
finally the output of milk, eggs and wool. With milk and eggs only the amounts 
leaving the agricultural sector were evaluated. 
The evaluations of milk and eggs are two major exceptions from the rule that 
official statistics as given are accepted without question. In both cases, however, 
my procedure has in fact official blessing. In the case of milk the official East 
German procedure to determine the milk yield was changed in 1956 and the milk 
yield as determined by both the old and the new method was given. This enabled 
me to correct the preceding years and to make them comparable with the latest 
figures, a procedure neglected by the East German Statistical Office6. 
As far as eggs are concerned, only the forced deliveries and government 
purchases of eggs plus an allowance for consumption by farmers have been 
evaluated at West German prices. 
The coverage of the major crops and animal products is virtually complete. 
Any questions of the results of my calculations can relate only to the magnitude 
of the deduction to get from biological to barn yield. Only such minor items as 
the number of beehives or the production of honey were omitted. 
Before discussing the input side, two further problems have to be mentioned. 
The one relates to the estimates for vegetables and fruits, the other to the estimates 
for the value of the forest sector. I t  was possible to make a rough allowance for 
vegetables, fruit and cut wood (both timber and fire wood) but it proved com- 
pletely impossible to make even a rough estimate of the change in the value of 
standing timber. 
The services of machine tractor stations as such, like the fodder grown on the 
farms, were treated as intermediate products and neither added as an output 
nor deducted as an input. On the other hand, separate estimates for the amount 
of gasoline and diesel oil used were made, and such fodder which farmers had to 
purchase from outside the agricultural sector, either imports or industrial prod- 
ucts, were deducted. The amounts of commercial fertilizer, and the electricity 
used on the farms could be directly ascertained, while manure was treated as an 
intermediate product. 
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5. In the 1957 edition of the Slatistisches jalrrburl~ der Deutschen Detnokratischen Republik it  is stated that 
the procedure for calculating the milk yield was changed in 1956 and that there was therefore a break in 
the comparability of the data. The 1956 edition does not contain such a footnote, but Statistische Praxis, the 
journal of the Statiatisches Zentralamt, did explain this fact. 
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(3)aThe estimation of the Gross Value Added of construction was considerably 
more difficult. As the major official East German data are given in value terms 
which had to be rejected for the reasons outlined above, it was assumed that 
construction moved parallel to the availability of building materials, hence an 
index of available (rather than produced) building materials was constructed from 
the amounts of bricks, tiles, cement and cement products, glass, etc., availablee. 
The index was weighted by 1936 or 1950 prices which not only gives different 
results from assigning to the various building materials a fixed weight', but also 
allows for the substitution of cement and cement products for bricks which has 
occurred in the post-war period. 
The East German Statistical Yearbook gives also figures for the number of 
dwelling units produced and East German sources give data on the required 
inputs per dwelling. This has made a separate estimate for housing and other 
construction possible which was later used in estimates of gross investment. This 
will be explained presently. 
(4) The important transport sector was broken down by major carriers: rail- 
roads, inland waterways and ocean shipping, the last of extremely small im- 
portance due to the fact that the GDR inherited none of the major Baltic ports and 
had to develop both port facilities and ship building from scratch. No attempt 
was made to calculate the performance of air transport, but it is certain that 
both in 1936 and during the period under investigation it was insignificant. 
Freight transport was broken down into those heavy goods transported at specially 
low rates and all other goods shipped at high rates. This follows the practice of 
the old Reichsbahn. Suburban passenger traffic which is of major importance 
for Berlin was estimated separately. 
( 5 )  The procedures thus far discussed have all in common that, with minor ex- 
ceptions, they are based on data provided in physical units : tons, ton/miles, 
kWh, etc. For the other sectors : trade, communication, or services, calculations cannot 
possibly be based on physical units. It would have hardly made sense to measure 
the output of communications by the number of telegrams sent or letters delivered, 
nor would it have been reasonable to accept the official figures for trade turn-over 
as a basis for estimating the Value Added attributable to trade. 
Instead, trade and communications as well as other services were estimated 
by assuming that their Gross Value Added moved parallel to employment. This 
involved making an estimate both for employment in 1936 and the Value Added 
6. Mr. Fred Sanderson in Trends in Economic Grow/h constructed a similar index to estimate the Gross 
Value Added contributable to construction, using, however, the production rather than the available amounts 
of building materials for his index. This overstates substantially the expansion of construction since it appean 
that building materials were imported into the area of the GDR before the war in substantial amounts 
while in the post-war period a very large percentage of the cement production was exported. Thus in 1956 
about 570,000 tons of cement were exported out of a production of 3.3 million tons, i.e. about 116. In 1955 
exports of cement were 685,000 tons out of a production of about 3.0 million tons. Even bricks and tiles are 
exported in large quantities and apparently not imported. See, Trends in Economic Growth; a Comparison of 
Western Powers and the Soviet Bloc, a Study Prepared for the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, Joint 
Committee Print, 83rd Congress, Second Session. Washington, D.C., 1955, p. 292. 
7. This is the procedure of Mr. Sanderson. 
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per employee in these sectors. The procedure is very likely to overstate the per- 
formance of the Soviet German economy in these sectors during the first years 
of the First Five Year Plan, but for 1955 or 1957 it is likely to give reasonable 
results. There is little question that the many people employed in trade in 1950 
could hardly have had the productivity of 1936 when they had so much less to 
sell, but by 1956 this shortcoming of our method has probably been largely 
eliminated by the generally improved performance ofthe Soviet German economy. 
In other words, comparisons between 1956 or 1957 and 1936 are likely to be 
correct, but the rate of growth of the trade sector between 1950 and 1957 is likely 
to be understated. 
In general the estimates based on data given in physical units are likely to 
be reliable. I am convinced that any reasonable alternative procedure actually 
used would not change the end-result very much. 
On the other hand, estimates based on the “employment method” are not 
as good and even less reliable are estimates arrived at by deflation. Table I 
(p. 133), which gives the results of our calculation of GNP by origin presents one 
such alternative estimate derived by a process of deflation. The turn-over figures 
for trade have been deflated by an officially given retail price index which is 
based on 1936 but uses the commodity basket of 1955. I t  is an understatement 
to say that the results are improbable, but anyone wishing to use these figures 
instead of the figures arrived a t  by the employment method has the possibility 
of doing so. For communications it was not possible to make such an  estimate 
by the deflation method, but it is a relatively minor sector in any case. 
Gross National Product by Use 
Attempts have been made to estimate the uses to which the GNP is put, which 
though the best I have been able to make, have to be taken with a great deal ofsalt. 
The first officially supplied East German figures on national product by use 
were reported in the Quarter& Journal article. In the meantime more details have 
been published in the third volume of the Statistical Yearbook. This gives gross 
and net product in current prices by origins. Data are also available on deprecia- 
tion and materials used up by industrial origin in current East German prices, 
and a percentage distribution of the domestically available national income is 
given by investment and consumption. Unfortunately, these figures are difficult 
to use because, first, we don’t know enough about the price structure, secondly, 
we don’t know enough about the balance of payments, and, thirdly, the actual 
value of “the national income available at home” is not given. 
The East German claims on investment are quite modest, but the distorted 
price structure makes it certain that actual investments were a bigger percentage 
of national product than officially claimed. Furthermore it is known that at least 
through 1953 reparation payments were huge and it is virtually certain that the 
government sector as this term might be understood in the West, is relatively 
8. The reader is reminded that the East German concept of net product corresponds quite closely to 
the Western concept of net product, but that the East German concept of gross product is essentially a turn- 
over concept with no similarity to what is understood by that term in the West. 
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large in a planned economy. Since rationing even of elementary food stuffs was 
not abolished till 1958, it is also certain that consumption was relatively low. It 
is therefore of considerable interest to develop some sort of estimates of the uses 
of GNP, of investment and consumption and “other” uses, but it must be stressed 
that these estimates are extremely rough and that all estimates, but particularly 
the estimates for consumption and for “other” uses are subject to a large margin 
or error. 
( I )  The most reliable estimate refers probably to investment. This estimate de- 
pends essentially on the assumption that investment in equipment bears a reason- 
ably fixed ratio to investment in plant. The estimates for investment in plant 
and equipment proceded essentially in the following manner. First, housing and 
other non-industrial or non-commercial construction was split off on the basis 
of East German data. This led to a series of “other” construction which is basically 
investment in plant, in commercial buildings and some road buildings. Equip- 
ment is assumed to be twice the size of investment in plant. Although this figure 
is rather low by West German standards, it corresponds fairly well to American 
experience. This ratio has been suggested by Helmut KupkylO of the (West) 
Berlin Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, who derived this ratio of 
2 equipment to I plant in turn from East German sources. The great need for 
plant, due to destruction and dismantling as well as the peculiar nature of in- 
dustrial expansion involving essentially mining and heavy industries make the 
low ratio plausible”. The final estimate of gross fixed investment includes, of 
course, housing, etc., to be consistent with Western usage. 
Inventory accumulations have been estimatcd in yet another roundabout 
manner. Official data give inventories and fixed investments as a percentage of 
the domestically available income. I t  is assumed that inventories bear the same 
relation to investments in plant and equipment, as the percentage of inventory 
accumulation in domestically available national income bears to the same per- 
centage for The procedure seemed justifiable because the 
distortion of the price system (chiefly but not solely due to the importance of 
turnover taxes) is certainly much less serious within the investment sector than 
between the investment and the consumption sectors. 
9. Road building was very small. The statistics include also a very small expenditure on “Enttrum- 
merung”, i.e. the removal of rubber and the possible salvage of re-usable bricks and other materials which 
in East German practice is considered part of the output of the construction industry. 
10. HELMUT KUPKY, “Die langfristige Entwicklung der Brutto-Anlageinvestitionen der mitteldeutschen 
Industrie von 1gz4-rgy,”, Vierleljahreshefle zur Wirtschaflsforschung, 1957. No. 4, pp. 391-407. Mr. Kupky’s 
estimates for investment are in fact quite close to my own estimates in spite of the fact that they were derived 
by the entirely different and independent method of deflation. 
11. I n  West Germany, however, the ratio of plant to equipment is much closer to 4 to I and this fact 
does make one slightly uneasy about the East German estimates. O n  the other hand, in Poland and in 1955 
58% of investments were in building, 30% in machinery, and 12% in “other” investment, such asgeological 
exploration (see Rocznik Slalyslycmrty [Statistical Yearbook], 1957. p. 181). Thus my ratio is perhaps not too 
far off the mark. 
12. The Sinlistirches Jnhrbuch DDR, 1957 ed., foreshadows a change in methodology to bring Soviet 
German usage into line with Russian usage. I n  the past, “accumulation” has been defined in the GDR as 
“productive” accumulation only while housing, etc., was included with individual consumption, and school 
construction or “cultural” buildings were included with “societal consumption”. A footnote gives an alterna- 
tive percentage distribution to include both “productive” and “unproductive” accumulation. 
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(2) Data to estimate consumption directly from official East German data on 
important supplies to the public were insufficient. Hence the estimating procedure 
used starts with figures for the wage bill, given in current East Marks. These 
figures were adjusted for the changing proportion of dependent income earners 
in the labor force on the assumption that self-employed and other non-wage 
earners, earn on the average as much as wage and salary earners. I t  is difficult 
to say whether this procedure involves an over- or an under-estimate. The self- 
employed include on the one hand doctors and highly paid writers who are not 
in the employ of somebody else, but they also include many farmers and their 
working family members who may or may not be as well off as industrial workers 
and they include large numbers of persons working in retail trade who are almost 
certainly less well paid than industrial workers. 
Individuals may save, and indeed the personal savings in all thrift institutions 
have grown from about 1.3 billion East Mark in 1950 to 6.1 billion East Mark 
in 1956, hence the total income payments as calculated above have been adjusted 
by the annual change in saving deposits. A similar allowance is also made for 
the difference between the payments to and by the social security system and 
other insurances. 
The figures thus arrived at are essentially the total expenditures by the popula- 
tion for consumption goods. Further adjustments which would have been desirable 
but could not be made include an allowance for wage taxes on the expenditure 
side, and on the other hand for the many indirect payments to consumers made 
directly by plants and by the government, such as food supplied in factory canteens. 
The total wage payments adjusted in the manner described are then deflated 
by an official retail price index, given on the basis of 1936. This index is based on 
a commodity basket of 1955 and consists of 550 goodsls. An alternative deflation 
could be made by an equally official index of the cost of living. 
The cost of living index has risen from 100  in 1936 to “only” 307 per cent in 
1950 compared to 419 per cent for the retail price index; from 1936 to 1957 it 
has risen to “only” 188 per cent compared to 270 per cent for the retail price 
index. Deflation by the cost ofliving index would have therefore raised the estimate 
for consumption substantially. Nevertheless, it has seemed more reasonable to 
take the retail price index for purposes of deflation. In the first place the cost of 
living index contains rent payments which have not changed at all since 1936 
and expenditures on heat and light which have supposedly even fallen, even 
though it is known that housing is not only rationed and seriously short but 
exceedingly poor, and that the same is true for lightning. Some of the other 
categories, such as expenditures on food, drink and tobacco or clothing, which 
are included both in the retail price index and the cost of living index, show in 
the retail price index a much greater increase which probably reflects the fact 
that it includes non-rationed expenditures in a more reasonable proportion. If 
the difference between the retail price and the cost of living index had been due 
only to such differences as the inclusion of rent, a case could be made for the 
13. Stafistischer jnhrbuch DDR, 1956 ed., p. 201. Though the weight of the industrial commodity group 
remains constant at the relative importance they had in 1955, the actual commodities entering the index 
changed corresponding to the average quality of the particular year. 
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cost of living index. The mere fact, however, that the retail price index contains 
several identical items with the cost of living index and in addition such important 
categories as shoes, suggests that for purposes of estimating the GNP available for 
consumption, the retail price index is more suitable. 
Nevertheless, the estimates arrived at by assuming, on the one hand, that 
adjusted wage and salary payments are essentially equivalent to disposable in- 
come14, I may possibly underestimate the GNP used for consumption, first, because 
of the contributions of entrepreneurs to social security payments, secondly, of 
other indirect contributions by the industrial plants, and thirdly, because of what 
in Communist jargon is called societal consumption. O n  the other hand it is very 
unlikely that the price index provided by the Central Statistical Office errs in a 
direction unfavorable to the German Democratic Republic. 
When all the pros and cons of the suggested estimating procedure are weighted, 
it seems possible that consumption has been somewhat underestimated, but I am 
convinced that this underestimation is not very great. Because the results presented 
in Table 4 are rather startling, it has seemed essential to dwell at length on the 
considerations which have gone into the selection of the particular index used 
for deflation. 
(3) The “other” uses are found as a residual. They include the export surplus, 
including reparations, the government sector proper, and they include also such 
“societal consumption” as has not been possible to estimate separately. No esti- 
mates were possible to state reliably the relative importance of these various items. 
SUMMARY 
The article has two purposes: to give the results and to explain the methods of 
calculating the East German Gross National Product by industrial origin and 
domestic use. Wherever possible, comparisons with the developments in the 
Federal Republic were made. The original data come from official East German 
publications but the methodology is Western. All calculations were made in West 
German prices of 1950 and in 1936 German prices. 
The East German Gross National Product (GNP) was in 1957 about 122% of 
1936, and 155% of 1950. Industrial output passed the prewar level in 7953, the 
output of transport already in 1951, but trade and construction passed it only in 
1956. On the other hand, agriculture even in 1957 was still substantially below the 
prewar level. Unlike all other sectors, which developed vigorously since I 950, 
agriculture remained stagnant. 
Consumption in 1950 accounted for only about a third of GNP, undoubtedly 
largely because of reparations demands. After the June 1953 uprising it reached 
a level of 53%, while in West Germany it always was close to 60%. Gross investment 
14. Income taxes are unimportant and indirect taxes are allowed for in the price index. On the other 
hand, neither wage taxes nor the workers’ contribution to social security have been deducted. 
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as a percenlofGNPintheGermanDemocraticRepublicwasofabout the sameorder 
of magnitude as in the Federal Republic, but gross fixed investment reached West 
German rates only in 1956, while inventory accumulation was very high until the 
1953 uprising led to a precipitous drop. On a per capita basis, consumption and 
investment appear to be in East Germany only about 60y0 of West German levels, 
though they are slowly rising. 
The reasons for the differential developments are : (a) heavy reparations pay- 
ments at least through 1953; (b) constant loss of population to West Germany; 
(c) planning errors; and (d) insufficient international integration. The first has 
been stopped, and some planning errors have been eliminated. The loss of popu- 
lation may diminish as living conditions improve and there are attempts at im- 
proving the international organization of the Soviet bloc. 
Z USAM ME N FASS U N  G 
D a s  Sozialprodukt Ostdeutschlands. Der Artikel gibt die Ergebnisse und Schatzungs- 
methoden einer Berechnung des Bruttosozialprodukts der Deutschen Demokrati- 
schen Republik (DDR) nach Wirtschaftssektoren und Endbestimmung. Wo mog- 
lich werden Vergleiche mit der Bundesrepublik gemacht. Die Grunddaten 
stammen aus offiziellen Veroffentlichungen der DDR, aber die Methodologie ist 
westlich. Alle Berechnungen wurden in westdeutschen Preisen von 1950 und in 
deutschen Preisen von 1936 gemacht. 
Das Bruttosozialprodukt der DDR betrug 1957 etwa I 22% von 1936 und I 55% 
von 1950. Die Industrieproduktion uberstieg das Vorkriegsniveau im Jahre 1953, 
der Verkehr bereits 1951, aber Handel und Bauwirtschaft erst 1956. Andererseits 
lag die Landwirtschaftsproduktion selbst I 957 noch wesentlich unter dem Vor- 
kriegsstand. Im Unterschied zu allen andern Wirtschaftssektoren, die sich seit 
I 950 kraftig entwickelten, stagnierte die Landwirtschaft. 
Im Jahre 1950 ging nur ein Drittel des Bruttosozialprodukts der DDR in den 
Verbrauch, ohne Zweifel hauptsachlich wegen der grossen Reparationsforderun- 
gen. Nach dem Aufstand vom 17.Juni 1953 stieg der Anteil des Verbrauchs auf 
53%. In der Bundesrepublik war er immer nahe bei 60%. Die Bruttoinvestitionen 
hatten in Ost- und Westdeutschland etwa den gleichen Anteil am Bruttosozial- 
produkt; aber der Prozentsatz der Bruttoinvestitionen in Anlagen und Maschinen 
erreichte den westdeutschen Prozentsatz erst 1956, wahrend Lagerbestande bis 
zum Aufstand von 1953 einen sehr hohen AnteiI des Bruttosozialprodukts ver- 
brauchten, um nachher scharf abzufallen. Per capita Verbrauch und Investition 
betragen in der DDR etwa 60% des westdeutschen Niveaus, aber sie steigen all- 
mahlich. 
Die Griinde fur diese unterschiedliche Entwicklung sind : a) grosse Repara- 
tionsleistungen bis mindestens Ende I 953 ; b) dauernder Bevolkerungsverlust an 
Westdeutschland ; c) Planungsfehler und d) ungenugende internationale Ver- 
flechtung. Die Reparationen sind abgeschafft, und einige Planungsfehler sind 
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korrigiert worden. Der Bevolkerungsverlust wird wahrscheinlich abnehmen, wenn 
die Lebensbedingungen sich verbessern, und die ersten Versuche werden jetzt 
gemacht, die internationale Organisation des Sowjetblocks zu verbessern. 
Leproduit social de t’dllemagne de 1’Est. Le prtsent article a pour objet de donner les 
rtsultats et d’expliquer les mCthodes de calcul du produit social brut de la RCpu- 
blique DCmocratique Allemande par secteurs Cconomiques et destination finale. 
Partout oh cela a CtC possible, des comparaisons ont t t t  faites avec la RCpublique 
FCdCrale d’Allemagne. Les donnCes fondamentales proviennent des publications 
officielles de 1’Allemagne orientale, mais la mtthodologie est celle de 1’Ouest. 
Tous les calculs ont CtC faits en prix de I950 de 1’Allemagne occidentale et en prix 
allemands de I 936. 
Le produit social brut de I’Allemagne orientale a reprCsentC en 1957 quelque 
122% de celui de 1936 et 155% de celui de 1950. La production industrielle a dC- 
passt le niveau d’avant guerre en I 953, les transports en I 95 I dCja, tandis que pour 
le commerce et la construction, ce fut le cas en 1956 seulement. En revanche, la 
production agricole, mtme en 1957, etait notablement infkrieure B son niveau 
d’avant guerre. Contrairement B tous les autres secteurs Cconomiques, qui se sont 
vigoureusement dCveloppCs depuis I 950, l’agriculture est demeurCe stagnante. 
En 1950, la consommation n’a comptC que pour un tiers seulement du produit 
social brut, ce qui est indubitablement dh dans une large mesure aux exigences 
des rkparations. Aprks l’essor de juin 1953, elk a atteint un niveau de 53y0, tandis 
qu’en Allemagne occidentale, elk a toujours CtC proche de 60%. Le pourcentage 
des investissements bruts en RCpublique DCmocratique Allemande a CtC approxi- 
mativement du mtme ordre de grandeur que dans la Rtpublique FCdCrale, mais 
le pourcentage des investissements bruts en installations et machines n’a atteint 
le niveau de 1’Allemagne de 1’Ouest qu’en 1956, tandis que les stocks furent trts 
&lev& jusqu’a ce que l’avance de 1953 eut conduit a une rapide diminution. Par 
t?te d’habitant, la consommation et les investissements ne representent en Alle- 
magne orientale que 60% environ du niveau de 1’Allemagne occidentale, bien 
qu’ils aillent progressivement croissant. 
Les raisons de cette tvolution divergente sont: a )  les lourdes prestations au 
titre des reparations jusqu’8 fin 1953 au moins; 6) la diminution constante de la 
population (mouvement vers 1’Allemagne occidentale) ; c )  les erreurs de planifi- 
cation et d )  une intkgration internationale insuffisante. Les rkparations sont 
abolies et quelques erreurs de planification ont Ctt Climintes. La diminution de 
la population se ralentira probablement, au fur et B mesure que les conditions de 
vie s’amklioreront, et des efforts sont accomplis en vue d’amtliorer l’organisation 
internationale du bloc sovittique. 
